Impact of Demand Response Participation in Energy, Reserve and Capacity Markets by Nolan, Sheila et al.
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Impact of Demand Response
Participation in Energy, Reserve and
Capacity Markets
Sheila Nolan and Mel Devine and Muireann Lynch and Mark
O’Malley
Electricity Research Centre, University College Dublin, Dublin 4,
Ireland, Economic and Social Research Institute, Whitaker Square,
Sir John Rogerson’s Quay, Dublin 2, Ireland, Department of
Economics, Trinity College Dublin, Dublin 2, Ireland
20 October 2016
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/74672/
MPRA Paper No. 74672, posted 25 October 2016 14:15 UTC
Impact of Demand Response Participation in Energy, Reserve and
Capacity Markets
Sheila Nolana, Mel T. Devineb,c, Muireann A´ Lynchb,c, Mark O‘Malleya
aElectricity Research Centre, University College Dublin, Dublin 4, Ireland
bEconomic and Social Research Institute, Whitaker Square, Sir John Rogerson’s Quay, Dublin 2, Ireland
cDepartment of Economics, Trinity College Dublin, Dublin 2, Ireland
Abstract
Demand response is capable of providing multiple services, including energy and reserve. As
a consequence of providing energy, demand response is also inherently contributing to genera-
tion adequacy, and thus may be in entitled to avail of revenue from a capacity remuneration
mechanism. Participation in multiple markets may result in a trade-off, thus necessitating si-
multaneous optimization of the demand response provision of such services. This paper uses
Mixed Complementarity Problems to investigate these trade-offs and resulting market outcomes
in the presence of load-shifting demand response. An approach to approximate the capacity
value of the demand response resource, thereby permitting its participation in the capacity mar-
ket, is also presented. It is found that, for the case study examined here, that demand response
has its most significant impact on the energy market, with marginal and negligible impacts on
the capacity and reserve market, respectively. The results also suggest that considerable cost
savings are attainable by the DR aggregator through participation in the energy market, but
that significant further cost savings are not forthcoming through participation in the reserve or
capacity market.
Keywords: Demand Response, Load-Shifting, Mixed Complementarity Problem, Markets,
Reserve, Capacity
1. Introduction
Demand Response (DR) can participate in multiple markets, including energy and ancillary
services markets, as well as in capacity markets, thereby potentially availing of multiple revenue
streams. It has been shown in the literature that DR is technically capable of operating in all
electricity markets. DR is capable of participating in the energy market, by offering services
such as load-shifting. Load-shifting programs can assist in reducing the need for expensive
Nomenclature
Abbreviations
CRM Capacity remuneration mechanism
CV Capacity Value
DR Demand Response
ELCC Effective Load Carrying Capability
KKT Karush-Kuhn-Tucker
MCP Mixed Complementarity Problem
UCED Unit Commitment and Economic Dispatch
Indices
capacity Relates to capacity market
energy Relates to energy market
i Firm
j Technology
reserve Relates to reserve market
t Time in hours
Parameters
CAP Initial installed generating capacity
DEM Non-interruptible system demand
DMAX Maximum capacity of demand response re-
source
DREF Reference demand
E Elasticity of demand
ICOST Investment cost
MC Marginal operating cost
MCOST Maintenance cost
RESERV EREQ Reserve requirement
TARGET Capacity market target
WIND Wind generation
Variables
κ Capacity price
λ System marginal price
µ Reserve price
Π Profit
capbid Capacity market bid
capdr Capacity market bid of the demand response
resource
drdown Load-shifting downwards
drup Load-shifting upwards
exit Market exit decision variable
gen Generator power output
invest Generation capacity investment decision vari-
able
reservedr Reserve provision from the demand re-
sponse resource
reservegen Reserve provision from a generating unit
Sets
H Set containing the first hour of each day
peaking units and in flattening the load profile, by reducing demand at times of high prices and,
in the case of load-shifting, by increasing load at times of lower electricity market prices. As a
consequence of load-shifting, DR is also also inherently contributing to generation adequacy, thus
DR can provide capacity and thus receive capacity payments or operate in capacity markets and
ultimately contribute to generation adequacy [1]. Finally, it has been illustrated in the literature
that DR is well-placed to provide some reserve services [2, 3, 4, 5], which we define as services
which the system operator employs over various time-frames to maintain the supply-demand
balance on a continuous basis [6].
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The importance of valuing DR was highlighted in [7], where it was noted that undervaluing
DR could leave a beneficial resource underexploited, while overvaluing could lead to a situation
where there is considerable investment in a resource than cannot be effectively realized. The
aim of this paper is to inform the discussion on the value of DR by exploring the impact of DR
participation in various electricity markets, simultaneously.
Given that DR can contribute to generation adequacy, and thus has a capacity value (CV),
as shown in [8, 9], albeit low in comparison to thermal generation, it is necessary to consider how
DR would impact upon electricity markets and upon capacity remuneration mechanisms (CRM).
While there has been considerable work reported in the literature in the area of DR participation
in electricity markets, there has been little work exploring the impact of DR participating in
all three electricity markets (energy, reserve and capacity) simultaneously. Participation of DR
in multiple markets may necessitate in a trade-off between the services offered. Thus there is
a need for consideration of simultaneous optimization of the DR provision of multiple services.
This paper aims to inform the discussion on these topics.
It is acknowledged that there are many types of DR resources, many different programs to
exploit these resources and multiple approaches to modeling them. In this paper, one type of
DR resource is considered: electrical space and water heating. Such a resource is chosen because
of the inherent thermal inertia associated with it, making it suitable for load-shifting, whilst still
maintaining the ability to meet customers’ heating demands.
This paper considers an electricity system with energy and reserve markets, as well as a ca-
pacity market in the form of a capacity auction. Multiple firms with different initial endowments
of generating capacity compete with each other and participate in the three electricity markets
in an effort to maximize their profits. Each firm decides the level of generation, reserve provision,
capacity bid, investment and exit, subject to physical constraints, operating, maintenance and
investment costs and the market clearing prices. A DR aggregator is also considered, responsi-
ble for scheduling the operation of a load-shifting DR resource capable of providing reserve, but
also implicitly contributing to generation adequacy, whilst ensuring consumers’ requirements are
satisfied at all times. Similar to the generating firms, the DR aggregator seeks to maximize their
profit subject to resource constraints and the market clearing prices. The type of DR resource
considered is a load-shifting DR resource. Wind generation is also incorporated, however wind
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only contributes to the energy market and its sole function is to reduce net demand.
Five different models are developed in this paper, considering different combinations of DR
market participation. These models are discussed in detail in section 2.4. A novel method for
approximating the contribution of a DR resource to generation adequacy, and thus its ability to
participate in a capacity auction, is also presented in this paper, permitting inclusion of the DR
resource in the capacity market model. In order to model these different markets Mixed Com-
plementarity Problems (MCPs) are employed. MCPs involve the definition of complementarity
pairs for variables and equations [10]. This means that bounded variables must be mapped to
complementarity inequality. An MCP with function F seeks to find vectors x and y such that:
0 ≤ Fx(x, y) ⊥ x ≥ 0, (1a)
and
0 = Fy(x, y), y free. (1b)
Here x represents the nonnegatively constrained variables with associated nonnegative F
components denoted Fx while y represents the free variables associated with components Fy
that must equal zero exactly [11]. Note: the perb notation, 0 ≤ a ⊥ b ≥ 0, is equivalent to
a ≥ 0, b ≥ 0 and ab = 0.
MCPs are typically made up of the combination of Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions
for optimality from multiple interconnected optimization problems in addition to the market
clearing conditions that connect the problems. Assuming the individual optimization problems
are convex, the KKT conditions are both necessary and sufficient for optimality. Consequently,
solving the MCP solves the different players’ optimization problems simultaneously and in equi-
librium. The benefits of the MCP approach include the ability to optimize the problems of
multiple players simultaneously. Furthermore, MCPs allow primal and dual variables to be con-
strained together. For example, in the formulation presented in this paper, the output of all
generators, with the output of the DR resource, and prices are constrained together via mar-
ket clearing conditions. An MCP is a particularly useful method when computing a market
equilibrium which cannot be represented by an optimization model [10].
Many economic problems can be expressed as MCPs and, consequently, MCPs have been
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widely deployed in the literature for electricity market analysis. Ho¨schle et al. [12] employ an
MCP to analyze the impact of a CRM on total system costs. Ventosa et al. [13] employ an
MCP to represent the participation of hydro and thermal generation in a competitive market.
A case study of the Spanish electric power system is used in Liang et al. [14] combining an
energy and regulation reserve market model. Bushnell [15] presents a framework for studying
the competition between multiple firms with hydrothermal generation portfolios. Haikel [16]
compares three investment incentive mechanisms (1. capacity payment, 2. forward capacity
market, 3. reliability options) and finds that market-based mechanisms would be the most
cost-efficient way of ensuring long-term system adequacy and encouraging earlier and adequate
new investments. Lynch and Devine [17] utilize a stochastic MCP to examine the effects of
refurbishment on electricity prices and investment in generating technology.
In recent years there has been a move towards incorporating price responsive demand in MCP.
Daoxin et al. [18] include both renewable energy generation and price responsive demand in their
MCP. The inclusion of price responsive demand is achieved through the use of a control parameter
which reflects the response of consumers to changes in price. However, constraints on the price
responsive demand are not taken into account and reserve provision is not considered. While
there has been research examining the interaction of DR with high levels of wind penetration,
reserve markets with DR participation have only been incorporated through the use of a Unit
Commitment and Economic Dispatch (UCED) algorithm [19, 20]. Both [19] and [20] examine
the provision of both energy and reserve from DR using a UCED algorithm and assess the impact
on operation and cost savings.
In the first case study in [20], demand is modeled as a constant value modified by a sinusoid.
Additionally, the authors in [20] chose to only include two generation units in the portfolio; a
base load unit and a peaking unit. Furthermore, they have assumed that DR is a fixed fraction of
the total system demand at each point in time. In the second case study in [20], hourly demand
and wind data is utilized and DR is assumed to be 5% of the system load in each hour. Rather
than assume a percentage of the system load which is shiftable, this paper instead utilizes actual
data for the demand-side resource requirements and the power system demand.
Conejo et al. [21] propose an hourly real-time DR model. The demand model seeks to
minimize the cost of meeting the load minus the utility of the customers [21]. Unlike the model
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in [18], the model developed in [21] crucially includes physical constraints pertaining to the
demand resource, including a minimum energy consumption constraint, and ramping limits on
hourly load levels. However, again no consideration is given to reserve provision by the DR
resource.
Nekouei et al.[22] provide a game-theoretic approach for DR. Interplay between aggregators
and generators is formulated as a Stakelberg leader game, in which the aggregator influences
the spot price of electricity. The consumer seeks to minimize its load curtailment costs, while
the aggregator seeks to minimize the aggregate inconvenience of customers. They applied the
Stackelberg game to analyze the profitability of DR in South Australia. Crucially, reserve
provision by the demand-side is not considered in the model in [22].
The authors in [23] employ an MCP model to minimize costs and incorporate prices re-
sponsive demand. In their work on determining an optimal generation mix with DR and wind
penetration, De Jonghe et al. [23] reviewed some of the literature and found that there have
been no generation technology mix models that integrate energy efficiency programs, DR to
hourly varying prices and dynamic operating constraints simultaneously. In their paper, they
propose three methodologies for integrating short-term demand responsiveness into a technol-
ogy mix optimization model, one of which is a complementarity programming method [23] and
utilize the same DR models in each method. As regards the complementarity programming
method employed in [23],the authors formulate a mixed linear complementarity problem, not
dissimilar to what is presented in this paper. The key difference is the manner in which the
DR is represented. A reference price and quantity demanded for each hour is considered in [23]
and elasticity assumptions are utilized[23]. The reference price is the quantity weighted aver-
age of the hourly energy prices over the time horizon and the short-term demand function that
expresses quantity demanded as a function of relative deviations from the reference price [23].
In this paper, a load-shifting DR resource is modeled, separate from elastic or price-responsive
demand, with the ability to provide reserve and contribute to generation adequacy, complete
with an energy limit constraint.
This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces the MCP methodology employed
and details the DR aggregator problem. Input data, case study information and a description of
the different market models employed is discussed in Section 2.5. Section 3 presents the results
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of the various case studies and sensitivities, while Section 4 discusses the key findings.
2. Methodology
This section details the firms’ and DR aggregator problems as well as the market clearing
conditions, under competitive market conditions. The corresponding KKT conditions are also
derived and presented in the Appendix. Throughout this section, parameters are denoted with
capitals, primal variables are denoted with lower case lettering. Variables in parentheses, along-
side constraints, are the Lagrange multipliers associated with the constraints and are denoted
with lower-case Greek letters.
2.1. Generating Firm’s Problem
Each generating firm may have multiple types of generating technologies. Its problem in-
volves choosing the amount of generation (gent,i,j), reserve provision (reservet,i,jgen ) and capacity
bid (capi,jbid), as well as investment in new capacity (invest
i,j) and decommissioning of existing
capacity (exiti,j), for all of its generating units in order to maximize their profits, Πigen. These
profits consist of profit from the energy, reserve and capacity markets, ΠiEnergy, Π
i
Reserve and
ΠiCapacity, respectively, where i is an index representing each different firm, j represents the
generating technology and t is the time index, in this case 1-hour. Firm i’s problem is:
max
gen
exit
invest
cap
Πi =
∑
j
Πi,jenergy +
∑
j
Πi,jreserve +
∑
j
Πi,jcapacity, (2a)
where
Πi,jenergy =
∑
t
(gent,i,j)× (λt −MC i,j), (2b)
Πi,jreserve =
∑
t
(reservet,i,jGen)× µt, (2c)
Πi,jcapacity = (cap
i,j
bid)× (κ)− (investi,j)× ICOST j − (CAP i,j − exiti,j)×MCOST j, (2d)
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subject to:
gent,i,j + reservet,i,jGen ≤ CAP i,j − exiti,j + investi,j, (θt,j1 ), ∀t, j, (2e)
capi,jbid ≤ CAP i,j − exiti,j + investi,j, (θi,j2 ), ∀t, j, (2f)
The variables λt, µt and κ represent the prices associated with the energy, reserve and
capacity markets receptively. Each are exogenous to the firms’ problems but are variables of the
overall model determined via the market clearing conditions. All of the generating firm’s primal
variables are constrained to be non-negative.
The parameter MCi,j denotes the marginal cost of generating firm i technology j, ICOST j
represents the investment cost of generating technology j, while MCOST j is the maintenance
cost associated with technology j. The parameter CAP i,j represents the initial endowment of
generating capacity for each firm i and for each technology j.
Equation (2a) is the objective function of the generating firm. Each generating firms choses
how to participate in each market in order to maximize their profit. Equation (2b) represents the
energy component profit of the generator and consists of the revenue obtained from the energy
market less the marginal cost MCi,j of producing energy. Equation (2c) denotes the reserve
component of the generator’s profit. As can be seen, there is no cost component associated
with providing reserve as it is assumed that the cost of providing reserve is the opportunity
cost of not providing energy. Equation (2d) represents the revenue from the capacity market
less investment costs and maintenance costs associated with providing capacity. Equation (2e)
constrains the power and reserve provided by a generating unit to be strictly less than or equal
to the installed capacity of the unit, taking any exit and investment decisions into account.
Equation (2f) ensures the capacity bid of each generator does not exceed the installed capacity.
2.2. Demand Response Aggregator Problem - Energy, Reserve and Capacity Markets
The DR aggregator’s problem is to choose DR in both the downward and upward direction,
drtdown and dr
t
up, respectively, reserve provision, reserve
t
dr, and capacity market bids capdr so
as to maximize profits from the energy, reserve and capacity markets. The total load-shifting
performed by the DR resource is the net result of a combination of drtdown and dr
t
up, the upwards
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and downwards change in demand at each time, t. In this paper, DR can only provide reserve
in the downward direction (from the DR point of view). This DR reserve is assumed to be
analogous to a generator providing upward reserve, permitting the formulation of Equation (4c)
to represent a reserve market.
As shown in [9, 24, 25], DR is capable of reducing peak demand thereby displacing a certain
amount of peaking generating capacity. This capability is often referred to as the contribution to
generation adequacy of the resource. Generation adequacy is defined as the existence of sufficient
generating capacity on the power system to meet peak load and is usually expressed by capacity
value metrics [26]. In [25] a new metric called the Equivalent Generation Capacity Substituted
is proposed. The authors in [25] suggest that the Equivalent Generation Capacity Substituted
metric indicates the amount of conventional generation capacity that can be displaced by DR
without impacting upon the original level of generation adequacy. In [8], the Effective Load
Carrying Capability (ELCC) is the metric used, which is the amount by which a system’s load
can increase when the generator is added to the system, while maintaining the system’s adequacy
[27]. It should be noted, as highlighted in [28], that there are a variety of possible definitions
and calculation methods for capacity value metrics. Thus, there is not one single definite value
for the capacity value of a resource.
Throughout an entire year, the period during which a lack of generation adequacy would
be most apparent is the peak demand period. In the MCP models presented here, firms make
investment and exit decisions based on the peak system demand and their profitability. Firms
decide to invest in generation if there is a deficit during peak periods and there is scope for
them to recoup their investment costs. On the other hand, firms will opt to exit the market if
there is excess generating capacity, displacing their operation at the peak, thus impacting upon
their profits. Thus it is plausible that a change in investment seen with the addition of a DR
resource in an MCP model is representative of the contribution of the DR resource to generation
adequacy. Consequently, it is proposed here that the change in generator investment due to the
addition of the DR resource is an indication of the capacity value of the DR resource, and the
DR resource is then in a position to participate in the capacity market.
It is assumed that, in future electricity markets, reference demands relating to DR re-
sources will be knowable and obtainable by DR aggregators, and that reserve markets are
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non-discriminatory, permitting the participation of DR. It is also assumed that DR aggrega-
tors are capable of responding to wholesale electricity market prices. Assuming the DR resource
is capable of providing a response (drtdown and dr
t
up) and providing reserve in the same period as
well as the ability to participate in the capacity market, the DR aggregators problem is:
max
drdown
drup
reservedr
capdr
Πdr = Πenergy + Πreserve + Πcapacity, (3a)
where
Πenergy =
∑
t
(drtdown − drtup −DREF t)× λt, (3b)
Πreserve =
∑
t
(reservetdr)× µt, (3c)
Πcap = capdr × κ−MCslack × slack, (3d)
subject to:
drtdown + reserve
t
DR ≤ DREF t, (γt1), ∀t, (3e)
drtup +DREF
t ≤ DMAX, (γt2), ∀t, (3f)
t′+23∑
t=t′
(drtdown) =
t′+23∑
t=t′
(drtup), (γ
t′
3 ), ∀t′ ∈ H = {1, 25, 49, ......}, (3g)
capdr ≤
∑
i,j
INV EST i,jNoDR −
∑
i,j
investi,jDR + slack, (γ4). (3h)
The parameter DREF t represents the amount of load end-users would wish to consume at
a specific point in time, t, and thus represents the electrical demand in the absence of DR. The
parameter DMAX represents the total installed capacity of the DR resource. Equation (3a) is
the objective function of the DR aggregator. The DR aggregator choses how to participate in
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each market in order to maximize their profit. Equation (3b) represents the energy component
of the DR aggregator’s profit and consists of the revenue obtained from the energy market
due to load-shifting as well as the cost of meeting the consumers reference demand, DREF t.
Equation (3c) denotes the reserve component of the DR aggregator’s profit, while Equation (3d)
represents the capacity component. As can be seen, there is no cost component associated with
providing reserve as it is assumed that the cost of providing reserve is the opportunity cost
of not participating in the energy market. Constraint (3e) ensures that, in each time-step, t,
the DR aggregator can only shift downwards and can only provide upward reserve (from the
point of view of the power system) by an amount less than or equal to the reference demand.
That is, there can only be downwards shifting load and reserve if the end-user appliances are
on and available. Equation (3f) constraints the upward shifting of the resource to be less than
the installed capacity of the end-user appliance, DMAX. Constraint 3g represents the energy
limited nature of the DR resource and ensures that any shifting downwards is balanced by
shifting upwards over a 24 hour period, where H is the set containing the first hour of each day.
As is the case for the firms’ problems, the prices λt, µt and κ are exogenous to the DR agregators
problem and are determined via market clearing conditions. All of the DR aggregator’s primal
variables are constrained to be non-negative.
Load-shifting DR is chosen here and is modeled in a generic way in this study. It is intended
that the model of the DR can be made resource-specific in future work by varying the values
of the parameters relating the maximum installed capacity, DMAX, the reference demand,
DREF t, and whether or not the resource can provide reserve.
The authors in [20] model DR in a broadly similar way to the representation employed
here, but DR reserve is modeled differently. DR reserve is taken to be the difference between
the installed capacity of the DR resource and the DR output, in the same way reserve from a
generator is modeled. However, in [20], the DR resource output can be positive or negative and
so this would suggest that the reserve provided by the DR resource can be upward or downward
reserve. However, it also suggests that the reserve provided by the resource can actually exceed
the maximum capacity of the DR resource at that instant, which is not plausible in reality. In
contrast, here reserve is modeled one direction only to avoid this problem.
Equations (3d) and (3h) represent the manner in which the DR resource is able to participate
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in the capacity market. The capacity bid, capdr, is equal to the change in investment from the
‘no DR’ case (the parameter
∑
i,j INV EST
i,j
noDR, see section 2.4) to the case ‘with DR’ case
(the variable
∑
i,j invest
i,j
DR). The change in investment is an approximation for the generation
adequacy contribution of the DR resource. The slack variable is included in order to ensure
that there is no opportunity for the DR aggregator to over-estimate the generation adequacy
contribution of the resource. This variable represents generation from an expensive generating
unit, MCslack, which would be required to make up any difference between the capacity bid of
the DR and the actual, realized generation adequacy contribution of the resource. If the change
in investment between the ‘no DR’ case and the ‘with DR’ case is zero, the high cost associated
with the slack variable forces the variable capdr to be zero also. Thus, while the slack variable
represents generation, its sole function is to ensure that the DR aggregator problem is feasible;
there is no participation of this generator in any of the electricity markets.
2.3. Market Clearing Conditions
The different MCPs consider different types of market clearing conditions. These connect
each of the firms problems and the DR aggregator problem. The first type of market clearing
condition is associated with the energy market and when DR is not considered:
∑
i
Gent,i = DEM t + E × λt, ∀t, (λt), (4a)
where the parameter DEM t denotes the system demand in hour t and the parameter E
represents the elasticity of load, which henceforth refers to elasticity associated with demand or
price-responsive load. This price-responsive load is distinct from the DR resource’s load shifting.
When DR is included Equation (4a) becomes:
∑
i
gent,i = DEM t −DREF t + drtup − drtdown + E × λt, ∀t, (λt). (4b)
This type of DR is a load-shifting DR resource. The parameter DREF t, as mentioned
earlier, denotes the end-users requirements at each point in time. To avoid double counting this
parameter is removed from the supply-demand equation as it is the demand which is satisfied by
the load-shifting operation of the DR resource. Wind generation is also incorporated, however
it is assumed that wind is a price-taker and does not provide any reserve or a contribution to
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the capacity market. Therefore wind only contributes to the energy market and its sole function
is to reduce net demand. In the analysis which follows, when wind generation is considered it
is included as net load. The reserve and capacity markets, with and without DR participation
are shown below:
∑
i
reservet,iGen = RESERV EREQ, ∀t, (µt), (4c)
∑
i
reservet,iGen + reserve
t
DR = RESERV EREQ, ∀t, (µt), (4d)
∑
i
capibid = TARGET, (κ), (4e)
∑
i
capibid + capdr = TARGET, (κ). (4f)
Equations (4c) and (4d) represent the reserve market with and without DR participation, while
including a reserve requirement, the parameter RESERV EREQ. Similarly, the capacity market
with and without DR is represented by Equations (4e) and (4f), respectively, where the parameter
TARGET represents the amount of generating capacity required.
2.4. MCP Models and Sensitivities
The authors in [23] suggest that since their MCP model minimizes costs and incorporates
price-responsive demand, it can be viewed as a optimal generation technology mix model. Sim-
ilarly, the models employed in this paper (see Figure 1) minimize costs, incorporate both elastic
demand and DR, allow for investment and withdrawal of generation and include DR. Thus, these
models may also be considered optimal generation technology mix models.
The MCP models are developed in the General Algebraic Modeling System (GAMS) and
solved using the PATH solver [29]. Due to the considerable computation time, the MCP analy-
sis is performed for the first 100 days of the year. The market clearing conditions presented in
the previous section are utilized in conjunction with the firms problems and the DR aggregator
problems in different combinations in order to produce a number of different MCP models, an
explanation of these models is now provided:
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Figure 1: Overview of the methodology
1 Without a DR resource - in this model there is no load-shifting DR but there is price-
responsive demand. The MCP consists of the generators’ problems, KKT conditions (6a)
through (6g), and market clearing conditions (4a), (4c), (4e). In order to solve models ii.
and iv. below, it is necessary to first solve this model in order to determine the variable∑
i,j invest
i,j, which becomes the parameter
∑
i,j INV EST
i,j
noDR in Constraint 3h in models
ii. and iv.
2 With a DR resource - for all of the following models, the MCP consists of the firms’
problems, KKT conditions (6a) through (6g). However, the market clearing condition
representations differ depending on what markets the DR resource is participating in.
i DR in Energy Market Only - the market clearing conditions in this model com-
prise Equations (4b), (4c) and (4e). The KKT conditions for the DR resource in
this model are KKT conditions (7a),(7b), (7d), (7e), (7f) and (7g) with the variable
reservetDR fixed to zero.
ii DR in Energy & Capacity Market Only - in this model DR only participates in
the energy market and capacity market. The market clearing conditions in this model
comprise Equations (4b), (4c) and (4f). The KKT conditions for the DR resource in
this model are KKT conditions (7a),(7b), (7d), (7e), (7f), (7g) and (7h), with the
variable reservetDR fixed to zero.
iii DR in Energy & Reserve Market Only - in this model DR only participates in
the energy market and reserve market. The market clearing conditions in this model
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comprise Equations (4b), (4d) and (4e). The KKT conditions for the DR resource in
this model are KKT conditions (7a),(7b), (7c), (7e), (7f) and (7g).
iv DR in All Markets - in this model DR participates in all available markets. The
market clearing conditions in this model comprise Equations (4b), (4d) and (4f). The
KKT conditions for the DR resource in this model are KKT conditions (7a) through
(7h).
All of the models presented above are examined by varying the input parameters for the
different peak load and wind penetration levels.
2.5. System Data
The initial endowment of generating capacity for each firm, CAP i,j, is shown in Table 1
and the corresponding cost characteristics are presented in Tables 2 and 3. Three generating
technologies are considered, baseload, mid-merit and peaking capacity. Firm 1 has baseload
capacity only, firm 2 has baseload and mid-merit capacity only, firm 3 and 5 are integrated
firms, with capacity in all three generation technologies. Firm 4 has baseload and peaking
capacity, while firm 6 has peaking capacity only. The marginal costs, maintenance costs and
investment costs are all based on the values employed in [17].
Table 1: Initial endowment of capacity CAP i,j for each firm (MW)
Technology f1 f2 f3 f4 f5 f6
Baseload 1000 800 500 500 400 —
Mid-Merit — 500 400 — 400 —
Peaking — — 200 300 200 200
Firm Total 1000 1300 1100 800 1000 200
From Table 1 it can be seen that the initial installed endowment of generating capacity is 5400
MW. Thus examining a peak load of 7500 MW represents the case where there is considerable
under capacity, while examining a peak load of 2500 MW represents over capacity.
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Table 2: Marginal Cost MCi,j for each firm (e/MW)
Technology f1 f2 f3 f4 f5 f6
Baseload 30 45 55 55 65 —
Mid Merit — 50 35 — 35 —
Peaking — — 93 83 93 93
Table 3: Generation Cost Characteristics (e/MW)
Technology Maintenance Investment
MCOST j ICOST j
Baseload 25 100000
Mid Merit 12 65000
Peaking 7 45000
The reserve requirement, RESERV EREQ, is 500 MW for all cases, unless otherwise stated.
The capacity target, TARGET , is 1.2 times the system peak load for all cases. In all cases
examined, all firms are assumed to be price-takers.
2.6. Demand Data
The reference DR data, denoted as DREF t, utilized in this paper is the space and water
heating demand profile for 100,000 apartments on the Irish system as determined by [30]. This
data was obtained through the development of ‘archetype models’ by [30], which are representa-
tive of a group of dwellings and dwelling loads. A set of reference dwellings is modeled in detail
by [30], using EnergyPlus, a deterministic building energy analysis and thermal load simulation
program [31]. These models are converted into building performance simulation ‘archetypes’ by
integrating high space and time resolution operational data. The set of dwelling archetypes is
used to generate annual profiles for space and domestic hot water heat demands on a fifteen-
minute basis. These consumer end-use heating time series are converted to hourly-resolution
and scaled for use in this paper. The installed capacity of the resource, DMAX, is 556 MW,
while the marginal cost associated with the slack variable, MCslack is e10,000 /MWh.
An annual system demand profile from Ireland for the year 2009 [32] is examined, and scaled
linearly as appropriate to produce the parameter DEM t, with different peak load levels. For
example, when peak load in the following sections is stated to be 7500 MW then, for each hourly
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timestep, DEM t is 1.5 times that when peak load is stated to be 5000 MW. Actual wind data
from Ireland, also for the year 2009, is employed. Elasticity of demand (E) is chosen to be −0.11
as this corresponds to the elasticity of demand on the Irish system as determined by Di Cosmo
& Hyland [33].
3. Results
3.1. Impact Demand Response on Energy Markets
The effect of including load-shifting DR can be seen in Figure 2. It is found that the impact
on the system marginal price (SMP) profile of adding in the DR resource diminishes with in-
creasing peak load, with the largest impact on SMP occurring in the case with a peak load of
2500 MW. Correspondingly, the system demand profile is altered with the addition of the DR
resource, though this effect reduces with increasing peak load. An understanding of the impact
of DR on the system demand profile is obtained from examining Figure 3: the DR resource
succeeds in reducing system peaks and increasing in system demand at the troughs. As a result
of the ability to load-shift, addition of the DR resource results in slight SMP reductions during
peak hours, but increased prices during off-peak hours. Figure 2 clearly illustrates this leveling
of the SMP during off peak hours.
Figure 2: SMP with and without demand response for a peak load of 2500 MW and no wind generation
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Figure 3: Change in system demand with the addition of demand response for a peak load of 2500 MW with
no wind generation
The reduction in impact on the demand profiles, and by extension, on the SMP profile, is
expected given that the size of the DR resource relative to the system demand is decreasing
with increasing peak load. The DR resource represents 22%, 11% and 7.4% for peak load levels
of 2500 MW, 5000 MW and 7500 MW, respectively. Thus, with increasing load, the impact the
DR resource has on the system load profile decreases.
The addition of DR in markets other than the energy market has very little impact on the
SMP. This is because the price variations in the energy market is the key driver of the operational
decisions of the DR resource. Furthermore, as will be discussed in the following section, for the
majority of cases examined the reserve price is zero at all times and thus there is little incentive
for the DR to drastically change its operational decisions in order to provide reserve as there
is little revenue to be gained. Additionally, the energy limitation constraint placed on the DR
resource, in order to ensure consumers’ needs are satisfied, restricts how the DR resource can
operate. Thus, permitting DR to participate in more than one electricity market simultaneously
does not severely impact upon the aggregator’s operational decision on how to operate the
resource.
When the reserve requirement is low, in this case 500 MW, it is found that the participation
of DR in both the energy and reserve markets has a negligible impact on the SMP profile.
The following section includes an examination of the impact an increase in the system reserve
requirement can have on the capacity and reserve markets.
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3.2. Impact of Demand Response on the Reserve Market and on the Capacity Auction
We now consider the impact of the load-shifting DR resource on the reserve market and the
capacity auction. When there is low reserve requirements (RESERV EREQ = 500MW ), the
reserve price (µt) is e0 in every timestep, with and without DR inclusion in the reserve market.
This is because, at such a low reserve requirement level, the generating firms are investing to
meet the capacity target, which far exceeds the reserve requirement, and thus the firms are
investing to receive capacity payments rather than to receive revenue from the reserve markets.
The capacity price is linked to the Lagrange multiplier of Equation (2f). When capi,jbid is
positive, that is when the firm chooses to participate in the capacity market, θi,j2 for firm i
and each technology j is equal to the price at which the capacity market clears, κ. Examining
the KKT conditions for the generator problem shows that θi,j2 is related to both the cost of
investment, ICOST j, and the cost of maintenance, MCOST j for each firm, as well as to θt,i,j1
through both Equation (6d) and (6e). In turn, θt,i,j1 is dependent on the marginal cost and the
SMP λ, through Equation (6a), as well as the reserve price µ through Equation (6b). Essentially
the decision for each firm i and each technology j, i.e each unit, to participate in the capacity
market is dependent upon the investment, maintenance and marginal costs and the revenue
earned from the electricity markets. Any firm and technology whose revenue does not cover
costs does not participate in the capacity market. Thus, the price at which the capacity market
clears, κ, is the value of the Lagrange multiplier θi,j2 for the firm and technology whose revenue
exactly equals the costs. These marginal units often do not participate in the energy or reserve
markets and so the only costs they incur are maintenance costs. Thus it will be seen that the
capacity prices are regularly equivalent to the marginal costs of the different technologies (see
Table 3).
Table 4 illustrates that the capacity price (κ), associated with different peak loads and with
0 MW of wind, does not change following the addition of DR. It is found that at a peak load
of 2500 MW, there is a slight increase in the installed capacity of peaking plants in the system
generating portfolio from the initial endowment of capacity. Thus, it is not surprising that the
capacity price is e7 per MW, as this equates to the maintenance cost of the peaking units.
At a peak load level of 5000 MW, the capacity price increases to e25 per MW for all scenarios
and all wind levels examined, with and without DR. Such a capacity price is to be expected
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given that e25 is the maintenance cost of baseload units and baseload generation dominates
the generating portfolio and there is no change in mid-merit or peaking capacity following the
addition of DR.
At a peak load level of 7500 MW, the capacity price remains at e25 per MW for all scenarios,
except at a wind penetration of 1500 MW, when the capacity prices increase dramatically, as
can be seen in Table 5. For the case of 1500 MW of wind, the capacity price is e110.
As will be seen in the next section 3.2.2, the capacity bids of the DR resource for all cases
are low relative to the capacity target, TARGET . DR participation in the capacity market
results in only very marginal changes to the generating firms’ investment and exit decisions, and
accordingly only minor changes to the capacity bids of the different firms. As the marginal unit
in the capacity market does not change following the addition of DR, the capacity price also
does not change, which is what is seen for the vast majority of cases examined (Tables 4 and
5). However, at a peak load of 7500 MW and with an installed wind capacity of 1500 MW there
are considerable changes in capacity price. The addition of DR in the energy market only and
in both the energy and reserve markets results in dramatic increases in the capacity price. As
might be expected, DR participation in the capacity market reduces these capacity prices by a
factor of 5 or more. The capacity price in this case, for all different DR market participation
scenarios is equivalent to the value of the Lagrange multiple of Constraint (2f) for Firm 1’s
baseload unit, θ2,bl2 .
Table 4: Capacity Prices for different peak load levels, a reserve requirement of 500 MW and wind 0 MW of
wind generation
Load No Energy Energy Energy All
Level DR Only & Res & Cap Markets
2500 MW e7 e7 e7 e7 e7
5000 MW e25 e25 e25 e25 e25
7500 MW e25 e25 e25 e25 e25
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Table 5: Capacity Prices for different peak load levels, a reserve requirement of 500 MW and wind 1500 MW
of wind generation
Load No Energy Energy Energy All
Level DR Only & Res & Cap Markets
2500 MW e7 e7 e7 e7 e7
5000 MW e25 e25 e25 e25 e25
7500 MW e110 e1402 e1402 e272 e272
Figure 4: SMP suppression at a peak load of 7500 MW with high wind generation
This large increase in capacity price at both high peak load levels and high wind penetration
levels is an interesting result. It is driven by the suppression in SMPs, which can be seen in
Figure 4, as a result of high wind generation and DR participation. This suppression in SMPs
would result in a reduction in generator revenue. However, the firms’ problem seeks to maximize
profits. Consequently, higher prices are needed to clear the capacity auction in order to cover
the costs associated with the high investment at high peak load levels and to maximize their
profits. Crucially, system operating costs do not increase drastically for this particular scenario,
as shown in Table 13.
3.2.1. Increasing the Reserve Requirement
We now consider the impact of increasing the reserve requirement. At the highest load level,
7500 MW, there is, initially, considerable under-capacity, as mentioned earlier. Thus, increasing
the reserve requirement to 1500 MW has no impact on the reserve price, which remains at e0,
as the generating firms are continuing to invest in order to meet the capacity target.
At lower peak load levels 2500 MW and 5000 MW, however, increasing the reserve require-
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ment to 1500 MW impacts upon both the reserve price (at the peak hour only) and on the
capacity price. At these lower peak load levels, the necessity to meet the more stringent reserve
requirement dominants investment decisions, that is the reserve market constraint becomes bind-
ing, and thus firms invest in order to meet the reserve requirement, not the capacity target. This
results in capacity prices of e0 for all cases, while the reserve price is extremely low at all hours,
except at the peak hour where the reserve price is e25. Figure 5 highlights that the increased
reserve requirement at a peak load of 2500 MW incentives greater levels of investment in mid-
merit and peaking generation.
Figure 5: Change in Installed Generating Capacity with increasing reserve requirement with no wind generation
- 2500 MW
While the same change in technology is not noted at peak load levels of 5000 MW or 7500
MW, there is a change in the installed capacity of each firm, with a tendency towards greater
levels of installed capacity for firms with more expensive baseload units, particularly firm 5.
However, as will be shown in section 3.3, particularly in Table 9, this increase in the capacity of
the most expensive baseload unit results in only a very marginal increase in the system operating
costs (an increase less than 0.053%).
At a peak load of 7500 MW however, there are capacity prices greater than e0, but it is
noted that there is a dependency on whether DR is participating in the capacity market. In the
cases were DR is not participating in the capacity market, the capacity price is e25, while it is
e0 when DR does provide capacity.
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3.2.2. Capacity Bids of the DR Resources
The estimated capacity bids for the DR resource with different peak load and wind gener-
ation levels are now considered. Table 6 compares the capacity bid estimations of the DR re-
sources, capdr, with the Effective Load Carrying Capability (ELCC) estimations obtained from
the methodology developed and presented in [8]. Both metrics are then expressed as a percent-
age of the installed capacity of the DR resource. Interestingly, the magnitude of the net change
in generating capacity does not change with the different scenarios, irrespective of whether there
is wind participation, unless load-shifting DR is participating in the capacity market. This is
as expected. The initial total endowment of capacity is 5400 MW and the peak system load
is typically similar or higher than this. The TARGET parameter for the capacity market is
set to be 1.2 times the peak system load, which results in a target for capacity exceeding the
initial endowment. In order to reach this target there is a requirement for additional generating
capacity, and as wind does not participate in the capacity market in these case studies, this
need for additional capacity results in investment in generation. When load-shifting DR does
participate in the capacity market, the net change in generating capacity is less than the case
without DR, as would be expected. It is found here that there is no change in the capacity bid
estimates of the DR resource, irrespective of whether or not reserve is provided. This is a result
of the fact that exit and investment decisions are incorporated.
Table 6: Comparison of the capacity bid estimation, capdr, of the DR resource with the Effective Load Carrying
Capability estimation at a peak load of 7500 MW and with 0 MW of wind generation
Metric MW Estimate CV
capdr 126 MW 23%
ELCC 132 MW 24%
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Table 7: Capacity bids of DR, capdr, with and without reserve provision, with a system reserve requirement of
500 MW
Peak Wind With Without
Load Level reserve reserve
2500 MW
0 MW 71 MW 71 MW
1500 MW 0 MW 0 MW
5000 MW
0 MW 123 MW 123 MW
1500 MW 110 MW 110 MW
7500 MW
0 MW 126 MW 126 MW
1500 MW 114 MW 118 MW
3.3. Impact of Demand Response on System Operating Costs
In order to determine the system operating costs, Equation (5a) is utilized for the model
without DR, while Equation (5b) is employed for all MCP models with DR. These system costs
are the total costs paid by consumers, rather than fuel, carbon and other costs incurred by the
generating firms. These equation represents the cost incurred by the system in meeting demand,
reserve and capacity requirements. The energy cost associated with wind participation in the
energy market is also considered.
CostnoDRSystem =
∑
t
∑
i
∑
j
(Gent,i,j×λt+Reservet,i,ijGen ×µt)+
∑
i
∑
j
(Capi,jBid)×κ+WINDt×λt (5a)
CostwithDRSystem =
∑
t
∑
i
∑
j
(Gent,i,j × λt +Reservet,i,ijGen × µt)+
∑
i
∑
j
(Capi,jBid)× κ+
∑
t
(ReservetDR × µt) + CapDR × κ+WINDt × λt (5b)
The analysis here shows that the increase in system costs with increasing peak load is roughly
commensurate with the magnitude of the increase in peak load. For example, the system costs
at 5000 MW are effectively two times the system costs at 2500 MW. Similarly, the system costs
at 7500 MW are a factor of 1.5 greater than the corresponding costs at a peak load of 5000 MW.
The percentage change in system costs with the addition of DR is 5%, 2.8% and 3.9%, for peak
load levels of 2500 MW, 5000 MW and 7500 MW, respectively.
Table 8 presents the system cost savings attainable for the different peak load levels and
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different wind penetrations, following the introduction of DR, with savings up to 7.4% possible.
The final row, which shows the results for the case with a peak load of 7500 MW and with 1500
MW of wind, includes two values. The first corresponds to the case where the DR resource does
not participate in the capacity market, and the second for when it does. The reason for the large
increase in system operating cost savings for this scenario is a result of the decrease in capacity
price, κ, following the introduction of the DR resource in the capacity market, see Table 5.
Table 8: Percentage reduction in system operating costs, including wind costs, following inclusion of Demand
Response
Peak Wind Percentage
Load Level Reduction
2500 MW
0 MW 5.9%
1500 MW 7.4%
5000 MW
0 MW 2.8%
1500 MW 2.8%
7500 MW
0 MW 1.1%
1500 MW 0.8% or 2.1%
The system operating costs for a range of different scenarios are presented in Table 13. It is
found that, for the majority of cases, there is no change between the cases with DR participation
in different combinations of energy markets. Once DR is added, the only change to the system
is participation of DR in the reserve and capacity markets, which, as seen earlier, does not result
in changes to either the reserve price or the capacity prices. As noted in the previous section,
at low levels of reserve requirement (in this case, 500 MW) the reserve price is zero at all times,
and participation of DR in the capacity market, which as was noted earlier, for the most part,
does not change with the addition DR.
The only scenario examined in which the system operating costs change with varying DR
market participation is the case with under-capacity and high wind penetration, i.e the case
with a peak load of 7500 MW and an installed wind capacity of 1500 MW. This is not surprising
given that this was the only case which experienced differing capacity prices with changing DR
participation.
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Table 9: System costs with DR participating in all markets with different reserve requirements - no wind gener-
ation
Peak Reserve Reserve
Load 500 MW 1500 MW
2500 MW e130,249,339 e130,296,961
5000 MW e271,405,604 e271,415,101
7500 MW e412,907,825 e413,126,622
As mentioned earlier, increasing the reserve requirement has an impact on both the reserve
price and the capacity price. Thus it is conceivable that there would be a similar impact on the
system operating costs. Table 9 compares the system operating costs with two different levels
of reserve requirement and illustrates that, as expected, the higher reserve requirement results
in increased system operating costs.
3.3.1. Generating firms’ Profits
Unlike the case with system operating costs, generator profit is not dramatically impacted
by the participation of DR in the various electricity markets. In fact, in some cases, firms’ profit
actually increases slightly with the introduction of the DR resource. Crucially, it appears that
generator profit is more heavily affected by the increasing penetration of wind generation than it
is by the participation of DR. These results differs from the work presented in [34], where it was
found that the introduction of more flexible demand generally reduces the profits of generators.
However, in this paper, the profit of the generator includes consideration of the cost of investing
in new generator technology as per Equation 2a, while in the work in [34], generator investment
decisions, and associated costs, were not included. Consequently, here it is seen that the profit
of generatoring firm increases slightly due to the fact that the introduction of DR results in less
generator investment. Generator profit, not accounting for investment costs, however, reveals
that there is indeed a reduction following the introduction of DR, thus confirming the results in
[34], albeit for a different system using a different method.
At a low load level, where the capacity of the DR resource represents 22% of the system peak
demand, the inclusion of DR in the energy market and in the energy and reserve markets has
an impact on the profit of Firms 3 and 5 (firms with both mid-merit and peaking technologies),
with these firms receiving considerably less profit. At higher load levels, the impact of DR on
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the profit of these firms becomes less pronounced. This is a result of the fact that the size of the
DR resource relative to the system load is reducing and thus its ability to impact upon energy
prices is also reducing.
Interestingly, at a peak load of 7500 MW, with an installed wind capacity of 1500 MW there
is a spike in the profit of Firms 2, 3 and 5 (the only firms with mid-merit generation), particularly
when the DR resource is not participating in the capacity market, which is not evident at other
load levels. The key reason for this spike in generator profit is due to the large increase in
capacity price seen at this wind level, as illustrated in Table 5. Furthermore, Firms 2,3 and 5
are profiting from the absence of the DR resource in the capacity auction.
3.4. Demand Response Aggregator Costs and Optimal Demand Response Portfolio
Tables 10, 11 and 12 indicate that the costs incurred by the DR aggregator decrease following
the inclusion of the resource in electricity markets. The aggregator cost savings as a result of
market participation are between 4% and 12%. However, for the different scenarios examined,
and for the chosen test system, it is found that there is only a very marginal reduction in
aggregator costs, and thus benefit to the consumers, as a result of participating in all three
markets, compared to participating in the energy market only. This suggests that there is no
simple formula for optimal DR participation - it is a case by case consideration.
As discussed in [7], savings on customers’ electricity bills may not be sufficient enough to
warrant investment in equipment and to compensate for the inconvenience [35] associated with
engaging in a DR program. This does indeed seem to be the case here.
The capacity payments earned by the DR resource varies depending on the peak load level,
since, as discussed earlier, the capacity price varies considerably with peak load level. In general,
however, the capacity payment acquired by the DR resource is less than e3,000, except at a
peak load level of 7500 MW and with a wind penetration of 1500 MW. The increase in capacity
payment in this scenario is not driven by a change in operating decisions on the part of the DR
aggregator. Rather it is a result of significantly higher capacity prices (see final row in Table 5).
From the results presented here it is difficult to ascertain the optimal DR portfolio. It is
found from Tables 10, 11 and 12 that the DR aggregator savings increase with increasing peak
load level. However, varying the marginal cost inputs, and thus the generating portfolio, it is
found that the DR aggregator savings remain relatively constant with increasing peak load level.
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Again, this hints at the optimal portfolio for DR being highly system dependent, as was the case
with the CV estimates presented in section 3.2.2.
In [36], it is discovered that system cost savings increase with increasing load participation
rates but do not grow at the same rate as load participation does. A similar trend in system
operational cost savings was noted here. Interestingly, aggregator cost savings have been found
to decrease with increasing participation rates. Furthermore, it is discovered that considerable
additional savings, over and above the savings as a result of participating in the energy only
market, are not awarded to the DR aggregator following the participation in the reserve market.
This is because it was found that reserve prices for this particular case study were effectively
zero at all times. Therefore, it could be argued that, for this particular stylized system and for
this specific DR resource, there is no benefit for the DR aggregator to participate in the reserve
market as there is little revenue to be earned. A slight increase in cost savings is achieved
through participation in the energy and capacity market, savings which increase at high peak
load levels and high installed wind levels. This a result of the fact that, as can be seen in Table
5, the capacity prices increase dramatically for this case. However, at lower wind levels and
at lower peak load levels, the optimal portfolio for the load-shifting resource examined here is
found to be participation in the energy market only.
The results here suggest that load-shifting resources, such as the type of DR resource consid-
ered here, do not benefit from participation in markets other than the energy market. Choosing
to participate in the reserve market may not result in considerable reward and may in fact put
consumers at a risk of inconvenience, in the form of their load requirements not being met during
emergency operating periods, that is periods when the DR resource is called upon to provide
reserve. This risk stems from the assumptions employed that any inconvenience placed on cus-
tomers as a result of failure to meet their heating requirements during emergency operation is
compensated by the revenue they receive by permitting their devices to be committed to pro-
viding reserve. It has been shown here that the reserve market may not in fact be particularly
lucrative for load-shifting DR resources, which concurs with the concerns stated in [35] that the
cost savings associated with DR may not justify the inconvenience placed on consumers.
While this assumption may be a misrepresentation of a load-shifting DR resource’s ability
to participation in the reserve market without inconveniencing the end-user, this is, in effect,
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captured within in the MCP results. The DR resource chooses to provide limited reserve, with
maximum reserve provision of between 7% and 13% of the installed capacity of the DR resource,
for all peak load levels and wind levels examined, for a reserve requirement of 500 MW. At
the higher level of reserve requirement, 1500 MW, it is found that the DR resource does opt
to provide slightly more reserve capacity, but this is a result of the fact that reserve prices at
the peak are now higher and the capacity prices are often zero, as discussed in Section 3.2.1.
It is acknowledged that some systems do not have reserve markets, but they do have reserve
payments. In such a system it may still be worthwhile for a DR resource, such as the type of
resource described here, to provide reserve.
As previously alluded to, load-shifting DR resources have an inherent contribution to gener-
ation adequacy as a result of their operation. Thus, given that the ability of the DR resource
to participate the capacity market is, in effect, a consequence of the operation of the resource
in the energy market, there does not appear to be any indication that participation in both the
energy and capacity markets results in a trade-off. Thus, in conclusion, the optimal portfolio
for the type of DR resource examined here is participation in the energy and capacity markets
only.
Table 10: DR Aggregator Costs - peak load 2500 MW
Wind Energy
DR Case Level Costs Savings
No DR
0 MW
e7,268,961 —
Energy Only e6,992,656 3.8%
Energy & Reserve e6,992,614 3.8%
Energy & Capacity e6,992,332 3.8%
All Markets e6,992,118 3.8%
No DR
1500 MW
e7,113,773 —
Energy Only e6,538,263 8.1%
Energy & Reserve e6,538,263 8.1%
Energy & Capacity e6,538,263 8.1%
All Markets e6,538,263 8.1%
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Table 11: DR Aggregator Costs - peak load 5000 MW
Wind Energy
DR Case Level Costs Savings
No DR
0 MW
e7,174,783 —
Energy Only e6,530,838 9%
Energy & Reserve e6,530,013 9%
Energy & Capacity e6,527,760 9%
All Markets e6,526,908 9%
No DR
1500 MW
e7,192,125 —
Energy Only e6,643,309 7.6%
Energy & Reserve e6,643,563 7.6%
Energy & Capacity e6,640,156 7.7%
All Markets e6,640,284 7.7%
Table 12: DR Aggregator Costs - peak load 7500 MW
Wind Energy
DR Case Level Costs Savings
No DR
0 MW
e7,193,387 —
Energy Only e6,526,963 9.3%
Energy & Reserve e6,528,960 9.3%
Energy & Capacity e6,523,612 9.3%
All Markets e6,525,829 9.3%
No DR
1500 MW
e7,191,498 —
Energy Only e6,528,872 9.2%
Energy & Reserve e6,529,387 9.2%
Energy & Capacity e6,497,859 9.7%
All Markets e6,361,990 11.5%
4. Conclusion
This paper examined the participation of a load-shifting DR resource in energy, reserve and
capacity markets in order to inform the discussion on the impact of DR. Five different models
considering different combinations of DR market participation are developed. These markets are
modeled as MCPs, permitting optimization of six different generating firms’ problems and a DR
aggregator’s problem simultaneously. An approach to approximate the contribution of the DR
resource to generation adequacy is also presented, permitting DR participation in the capacity
market.
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The results indicate that, in general, the DR resource can have a positive impact on electricity
markets. However, this impact is largely limited to the energy market. The participation of DR
in the energy market does succeed in reducing variability in SMP, whilst increasing prices at
off-peak hours and decreasing peak prices. There are significant system operating cost savings
to be obtained following the introduction of DR into electricity markets, mainly driven by the
impact of the DR resource on the energy market. It is found that there is minimal impact on
generating firms’ profits following the addition of DR in the various electricity markets.
In general, there are no major increases in DR aggregator savings as a result of DR partici-
pation in more than one market simultaneously, even at high peak load levels. It appears that
the ‘optimal DR portfolio’ is very much a case by case, system by system, consideration.
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Appendix
KKT conditions for firm providing energy, reserve and capacity
The KKT optimality conditions for all firms are given below:
0 ≤ gent,i,j ⊥ −λt + θt,i,j1 +MCi,j ≥ 0,∀t, i, j, (6a)
0 ≤ reservet,i,jGen ⊥ −µt + θt,i,j1 ≥ 0,∀t, i, j, (6b)
0 ≤ capi,jbid ⊥ −κ+ θi,j2 ≥ 0, ∀t, i, j, (6c)
0 ≤ investi,j ⊥ ICOSTi,j −
∑
t
θt,i,j1 − θi,j2 ≥ 0,∀t, i, j, (6d)
0 ≤ exiti,j ⊥ −MCOSTi,j +
∑
t
θt,i,j1 + θ
i,j
2 ≥ 0,∀t, i, j, (6e)
0 ≤ θt,i,j1 ⊥ CAPi,j − exiti,j + investi,j − gent,i,j − reservet,i,jGen ≥ 0,∀t, i, j, (6f)
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0 ≤ θi,j2 ⊥ CAP i,j − exiti,j + investi,j − capi,jbid ≥ 0,∀t, i, j. (6g)
As firm i’s problem is convex, the KKT conditions are both necessary and sufficient for optimality
[11].
KKT conditions for DR providing energy, reserve and capacity
The KKT conditions for the DR aggregator are shown below.
0 ≤ drtdown ⊥ −λt + γt1 + γt
′
3 ≥ 0, ∀t, t′ ∈ H, (7a)
0 ≤ drtup ⊥ λt + γt2 − γt
′
3 ≥ 0, ∀t, t′ ∈ H, (7b)
0 ≤ reservetDR ⊥ −µt + γ1 ≥ 0, ∀t, (7c)
0 ≤ CVDR ⊥ −κ+ γ4 ≥ 0, ∀t, (7d)
0 ≤ γt1 ⊥ DREF t − drtdown − reservetDR ≥ 0, ∀t, (7e)
0 ≤ γt2 ⊥ DMAX − drtup −DREF t ≥ 0, ∀t, (7f)
0 =
t′+23∑
t=t′
(drtdown)−
t′+23∑
t=t′
(drtup), γ
t′
3 free, ∀t′ ∈ H, (7g)
0 ≤ γ4 ⊥
∑
i
INV EST iNoDR −
∑
i
investiDR + slack ≥ 0. (7h)
As above, since the DR aggregator problem is convex, the KKT conditions are both necessary
and sufficient for optimality [11].
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Table 13: System operating costs, including wind costs, with different DR market participation combinations
Peak Wind No Energy Energy & Energy All
Load Level DR Only Capacity & Reserve Markets
2500 MW 0 MW e138,338,447 e130,249,339 e130,249,340 e130,249,340 e130,249,339
2500 MW 1500 MW e135,567,215 e125,590,205 e125,590,205 e125,590,205 e125,590,205
5000 MW 0 MW e279,132,776 e271,405,604 e271,405,605 e271,405,605 e271,405,604
5000 MW 1500 MW e278,979,306 e271,142,327 e271,142,327 e271,142,327 e271,142,327
7500 MW 0 MW e420,624,322 e412,907,825 e412,907,825 e412,907,825 e412,907,825
7500 MW 1500 MW e421,068,019 e417,519,853 e412,535,101 e417,519,853 e412,328,448
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